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Adam Spiers* 
General Dynamics Corporation v. United States: 
An Unnecessary Distortion of the State Secrets 
Privilege in the Contracting Context 
I. Introduction 
In January of 1991, after three years of development, the United States Navy 
terminated its contract for the A-12 Avenger carrier-based stealth aircraft. Over 
twenty two years later, the legal saga to determine the remedy in this breach of con-
tract dispute continues. 
In General Dynamics v. United States1 the Supreme Court of the United States ex-
amined what result should occur when the United States invokes its state secrets 
privilege to prevent discovery in a civil dispute.2 The Supreme Court unanimously 
held that a court should leave the parties as it found them when the government is 
unable to adequately respond to a contractor’s prima facie valid superior knowledge 
claim because the government properly invoked its state secrets privilege.3 Despite 
the Court’s assurance that its holding has clarified the state secrets privilege and will 
reduce litigation over the issue,4 an understanding of the defense industry under-
mines the Court’s assertion and questions the necessity of changing precedent. 
The purpose of this note is to discuss the state secrets privilege in the contracts 
context and provide greater insight into its likely impact upon the defense industry. 
The analysis section posits that while the Court’s holding appears, on its face, to be 
a practical way to reduce litigation when the state secrets privilege is raised, the 
Court’s opinion — combined with changes in the defense industrial market — will 
likely lead to more litigation over the state secrets privilege.5 Specifically, the General 
© 2013 Adam Spiers 
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 1. 131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 1903. 
 3. Id. at 1906. The state secrets privilege is a well-established exception to the rules of discovery that per-
mits the government to prevent disclosure of certain information pursuant to trial. United States v. Reynolds, 
345 U.S. 1, 6–7. 
 4. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 1909. 
 5. See infra Part V.A.  
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Dynamics holding is likely to increase litigation involving the state secrets privilege 
because the Court’s decision (a) provides the government with the ability and in-
centive to use the new legal standard to its advantage,6 (b) does not provide the gov-
ernment with incentive to contract around the state secrets privilege,7 and (c) does 
not dissuade government contractors from pursuing litigation when contracts are 
cancelled.8 These concerns are manifest in the present case as the Court’s holding 
and its stated purpose appear to be at odds.9 The Supreme Court should have af-
firmed the Court of Federal Claims’ ruling that left the parties bound by the Con-
tracting Officer’s determination instead of issuing a decision that, in effect, deter-
mined the merits of a claim deemed to be nonjusticiable.10 To remedy the current 
situation, Congress should pass legislation to statutorily restore the de facto prior 
precedent.11 
II. The Case 
In 1988, the Navy awarded two defense companies, General Dynamics Corporation 
and McDonnell Douglas Corporation, a contract for the full-scale engineering and 
development12 of the A-12 Avenger carrier-based stealth aircraft.13 The contract was 
a fixed-price agreement14 with a ceiling price of approximately $4.8 billion dollars, 
which was to be paid in installments throughout the life of the agreement.15 Accord-
ing to the contract, the Navy was to make an installment payment of $185,000,000 
on November 1, 1990, and a second payment of $553,200,000 on January 7, 1991.16 
In return, the contractors were to produce eight prototype aircraft that were to test 
different characteristics of the A-12.17 The first aircraft was scheduled to be delivered 
in June of 1990, with the other aircraft delivered monthly through January 1991.18 
 6. See infra Part V.A.2. 
 7. See infra Part V.A.3. 
 8. See infra Part V.A.4. 
 9. See infra Part V.A.5. 
 10. See infra Part V.B. 
 11. See infra Part V.C. 
 12. The purpose of an engineering and development contract is to mature necessary technologies and fi-
nalize the design of a system so as to demonstrate the capability of the platform and allow management of the 
platform’s lifecycle costs. DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY, DEFENSE ACQUISITION GUIDEBOOK 256–57 (2012) 
[hereinafter DEFENSE ACQUISITION GUIDEBOOK]. 
 13. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 358, 361 (1996), rev’d, 182 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 
1999).  
 14. A fixed-price agreement is a contract in which the government agrees to pay a government contractor a 
set amount regardless of the contractor’s costs. DEFENSE ACQUISITION GUIDEBOOK, supra note 12, at 1210. 
 15. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 35 Fed. Cl. at 361–62. 
 16. Id. at 362. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
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Early in the development process, General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas 
encountered difficulties in designing and manufacturing the A-12 aircraft.19 The 
contractors failed to deliver their first aircraft on time in June 1990.20 On August 17, 
after subsequent negotiations to restructure the schedule of the contract failed to 
reach a solution, the Navy unilaterally modified the contract to set a first fly date21 
of December 31, 1991.22 The Navy made its installment payment of $185 million in 
early November 1990.23 
Following a Major Aircraft Review study,24 the Navy’s support for the A-12 pro-
gram halted abruptly.25 On December 14, 1990, Secretary of Defense Cheney issued 
a show cause memorandum to the Navy, directing the Navy to justify, by January 4, 
1991, why the Department of Defense (DoD) should not terminate the A-12 pro-
gram.26 On December 17, the Navy issued a cure notice27 to the contractors.28 Short-
ly thereafter, the Office of the Secretary of Defense assumed control of the determi-
nation of whether to continue the program.29 Over the weekend of January 5–6, 
1991, the Office of the Secretary of Defense withdrew support for the A-12 program 
and refused to provide further funds for the program.30 The next day, the Navy’s 
Contracting Officer terminated the A-12 contract for contractor default.31 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. The first flight date of an aircraft is the date by which a working model of the aircraft must be proven 
operational. See DEFENSE ACQUISITION GUIDEBOOK, supra note 12, at 74–75. 
 22. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 35 Fed. Cl. at 362. 
 23. Id. at 363. 
 24. The Secretary of Defense specifically directed this additional program study to determine whether the 
end of the Cold War would impact the need for A-12 aircraft. U.S. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-92-
190FS, NAVAL AVIATION: EVENTS SURROUNDING THE NAVY’S A-12 AIRCRAFT PROGRAM 4 (1992). 
 25. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 35 Fed. Cl. at 365–68. 
 26. Id. at 364. 
 27. A cure notice is a government issued delinquency notice stipulating that a contractor’s performance is 
so deficient that the government may terminate the contract for default if the contractor does not cure the defi-
ciency in the time stipulated by the notice. 48 C.F.R. § 49.607 (2011). 
 28. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 35 Fed. Cl. at 364. 
 29. Id. at 365. 
 30. Id. at 365–66. 
 31. Id. at 367–68. Under the Contract Disputes Act, a contractor must submit a contract claim against the 
federal government to the contract’s Contracting Officer for a decision. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a) (Supp. V. 2012). 
The Contracting Officer must issue a written decision, which must include the Contracting Officer’s reasons for 
making its determination. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(d)–(e). The Contracting Officer’s decision is “final and conclu-
sive . . . unless an appeal or action is timely commenced as authorized by this chapter.” 41 U.S.C. § 7103(g). The 
Contracting Officer may terminate a contract for government convenience or contractor default. The govern-
ment may terminate a contract for convenience, in effect cancelling the contract and limiting the government’s 
obligation to the contractor for work completed, if the contractor fails to perform the contract and does not 
cure such failure within 10 days of receipt of a notice from the Contracting Officer specifying the failure. 48 
C.F.R. § 52.249–9 (2011). The government may, whenever the Contracting Officer determines that a termina-
tion is in the best interest of the government, terminate a contract for convenience. 48 C.F.R. § 52.249–2 (2011). 
When a termination for convenience occurs, the government is obligated to fulfill all contractual obligations 
agreed to in the contract’s default provisions. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.249–2 (2011). 
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By the date of contract termination, General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas 
had spent $3.88 billion attempting to develop the A-12 while the Government had 
provided $2.68 billion in progress payments.32 On February 5, 1991, the Navy sent 
McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics a letter demanding the return of ap-
proximately $1.35 billion in progress payments for default of the contract.33 On that 
same day, the defense contractors entered into a deferred payment agreement.34 
Under the terms of that agreement, the contractors acknowledged the government’s 
demand but the government agreed to defer collection pending court action.35 
On June 7, 1991, the defense contractors filed suit in Federal Claims Court under 
the Contract Disputes Act36 requesting that the court, inter alia, convert the termi-
nation for default into one for convenience.37 
At trial, the Plaintiffs asserted that the government had breached its duty under 
the “superior knowledge” doctrine.38 Discovery of Plaintiffs’ superior knowledge 
claim required access to two classified stealth aircraft programs, the Air Force’s B-2 
and F-117A programs.39 During the discovery process in March 1993, the acting-
Secretary of the Air Force, General Merrill McPeak, asserted the government had a 
right to call upon the state secrets privilege given the nature of the inquiry.40 Despite 
this warning, state secrets were revealed during two separate depositions in March 
and July of 1993.41 Shortly thereafter, the Acting Secretary of the Air Force filed a 
declaration formally invoking the state secrets privilege.42 The court found that the 
government had properly raised its state secrets privilege, and held that the court 
could not resolve the merits of the case and that further inquiry was needed to de-
termine whether Plaintiffs’ claim should be dismissed.43 
The Court of Federal Claims issued an order, based upon further factual inquiry, 
that the contract was terminated at the convenience of the Department of Defense, 
 32. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1903 (2011). 
 33. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 342, 345 (1992). 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 349. 
 36. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109 (Supp. V. 2012). 
 37. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 25 Cl. Ct. at 346. In full, Plaintiffs requested “(1) grant plaintiffs’ December 
31, 1990 equitable adjustment requests, (2) convert the termination for default to one for convenience, (3) deny 
defendant’s demand for return of progress payments, (4) award performance costs and reasonable profit, (5) 
award settlement expenses, and (6) award damages for breach of contract.” Id. In this instance, the conversion 
of contract termination for default to convenience would have resulted in plaintiffs receiving $1.2 billion from 
the government instead of plaintiffs owing the government $1.35 billion. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 
1903–05. 
 38. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 791, 791 (1993). The superior knowledge doc-
trine is an affirmative defense a contractor can assert against the government under specific circumstances. See 
infra Part III.A. 
 39. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 29 Fed. Cl. at 795. 
 40. Id. at 794–95.  
 41. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 1904.  
 42. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 29 Fed. Cl. at 794–95. 
 43. Id. at 795. 
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and thus vacated the determination that the cause of termination was contractor 
default.44 The court reasoned that the Navy had not provided evidence that it was 
displeased with the contractor’s performance, which was necessary to justify the 
contract termination for default.45 Subsequently, the Court of Federal Claims de-
termined that the contract was cancelled at the convenience of the government,46 
holding that that the DoD failed to exercise reasonable discretion when terminating 
the contract, but instead relied upon a technical default as a pretext.47 
A new trial was then held in order to determine the damages incurred by the 
DoD for terminating the contract at their convenience. The Federal Claims Court 
concluded that the government properly invoked its state secrets privilege and, giv-
en the circumstances of the case, the Plaintiffs’ superior knowledge could not be lit-
igated.48 The Federal Claims Court determined that the issue was nonjusticiable be-
cause “numerous layers of potentially dispositive facts” were hidden by the privilege 
and, as a result, any adjudication of the matter would be a “sham” trial.49 The court 
acknowledged that even a sham trial may pose a danger to national security.50 
Hence, the court determined that Plaintiffs’ damages were limited to incurred and 
allowable costs plus interest.51 
The Court of Federal Claims held, inter alia, that the court would assume the 
role of Contracting Officer in order to issue a final judgment, as opposed to re-
manding to the Navy’s Contracting Officer.52 At a subsequent trial, the Court of 
Federal Claims resolved that contractors and subcontractors were entitled to set-
tlements that were “reasonable, allocable, and allowable” under the contract.53 Rem-
edy may include “incurred costs, profit or loss adjustment, and the subcontractor’s 
settlement expenses.”54 The court determined that Plaintiffs’ reasonable, allocable 
and allowable costs were approximately $3.878 billion, but, since the contractors 
had already received $2.678 billion in payments, Plaintiffs were due only $1.200 bil-
lion plus statutory interest on that sum from June 26, 1991 until paid.55 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the trial court erred when 
it determined that the government’s decision to terminate the contract was unrelat-
 44. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, No. 91-1204C, 1994 WL 715992, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 9, 
1994). 
 45. Id. 
 46. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 358, 361 (1996). 
 47. Id. at 372–73. 
 48. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 270, 284–85 (1996). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 281–82. 
 51. Id. at 272. 
 52. Id. at 295.  
 53. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 529, 537 (1998), vacated, 182 F.3d 1319 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 555–56. 
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ed to the Plaintiffs’ ability to fulfill their obligations under the contract.56 The court 
vacated the trial court’s decision and remanded for a determination of whether the 
need to protect military secrets precluded discovery into the superior knowledge 
issue.57 Upon remand, the Court of Federal Claims reaffirmed its earlier decision 
that the government properly invoked the state secrets privilege and that doing so 
invalidated the Plaintiffs’ claim of superior knowledge.58 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed that the state 
secrets privilege was correctly invoked and that the privilege prevented adjudicating 
whether the Government’s superior knowledge excused the contract default.59 The 
Court of Appeals relied upon United States v. Reynolds,60 which held that the de-
fendant-government may invoke the state secrets privilege to prevent a plaintiff 
from discovering confidential information without having to abandon a legal de-
fense dependent upon concealed information.61 The Court of Appeals for the Feder-
al Circuit remanded on other grounds, however.62 Upon remand, the Court of Fed-
eral Claims held that the Contracting Officer had reasonably terminated the 
contract for default by the defense companies.63 The Court of Appeals for the Feder-
al Circuit affirmed.64 
On September 28, 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certio-
rari65 to consider “what remedy is proper when, to protect state secrets, a court dis-
misses a Government contractor’s prima facie valid affirmative defense to the Gov-
ernment’s allegations of contractual breach.”66  
III. Legal Background 
The holding of the General Dynamics case rests upon the legal background of the 
superior knowledge doctrine, the state secrets privilege, and the appropriate remedy 
when the state secrets privilege is properly invoked. 
 56. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 182 F.3d 1319, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 57. Id. at 1329–30. The Supreme Court of the United States denied the defense contractors’ petition for 
writ of certiorari. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 529 U.S. 1097, 1097 (2000). 
 58. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 311, 324–25 (2001), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part, 323 F.3d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 59. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 60. 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) (holding that the state secrets privilege exempted the government from releasing 
a classified accident report to the widows of Air Force pilots killed in a test of a secret aircraft). 
 61. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 323 F.3d at 1023. 
 62. Id. at 1010. 
 63. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 385, 437–38 (2007), aff’d, 567 F.3d 1340 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded sub nom. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011). 
 64. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 567 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated and remand-
ed sub nom. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1900. 
 65. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 62, 62 (2010). The case was consolidated with Boeing 
Co. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010). Id. 
 66. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 1903. 
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A. Superior Knowledge Doctrine 
The superior knowledge doctrine permits a contractor, under limited circumstanc-
es, to assert that the government has breached a contract by not revealing infor-
mation necessary for the contractor to perform the requirements of the contract.67 
To prove a breach under the superior knowledge doctrine, a contractor must pro-
duce specific evidence that it: 
(1) undert[ook] to perform without vital knowledge of a fact that affects 
performance costs or direction[,] 
(2) the government was aware the contractor had no knowledge of and had 
no reason to obtain such information[,] 
(3) any contract specification supplied misled the contractor, or did not put 
it on notice to inquire[,] and 
(4) the government failed to provide the relevant information.68 
A contractor must prove each element to prevail on a superior knowledge doctrine 
claim.69 For example, in Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. United States, a court held that 
the government violated the superior knowledge doctrine when the government 
awarded a contractor a contract to produce a disinfectant following a competitive 
bid process.70 Specifically, the government failed to inform the contractor that con-
tractual performance required the grinding of specific ingredients to produce a suit-
able product; the government had researched the disinfectant, which had never 
been mass-produced before; the government did not inform the bidders of the ne-
cessity of grinding the ingredient; and, by not grinding the ingredient, the contrac-
tor suffered financial loss when its product did not meet contractual specifications.71 
The government, however, will not be held liable for failing to provide infor-
mation to a contractor that is “readily available” from a different source.72 For in-
stance, in Bradley Const., Inc. v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims held that 
the federal government had not breached the superior knowledge doctrine when its 
contract did not stipulate that the contractor would incur additional costs for oper-
 67. GAF Corp. v. United States, 932 F.2d 947, 949 (1991). 
 68. Id. (citing Lopez v. A.C. & S. Inc., 858 F.2d 712, 717 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).  
 69. See id.  
 70. 312 F.2d 774, 778 (Ct. Cl. 1963). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Petrochem Services, Inc. v. United States, 837 F.2d 1076, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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ating in Indian Tribe Territory because the additional fees were required by public 
law.73 
At present, no “compartmentalized” programs exception to the superior 
knowledge doctrine exists.74 In other words, the government cannot claim that it is 
exempt from revealing information relating to a classified program when a contrac-
tor has brought a claim regarding a different but related program on the sole basis 
that the information from the first program is classified.75 Because the government’s 
security burden does not excuse it “from liability if it breaches an independent duty 
to reveal information,”76 a contractor is also able to invoke the state secrets privilege 
in its attempt to prove the government breached its duty to reveal superior 
knowledge. 
B. State Secrets Privilege and the Contracting Context 
The state secrets privilege in the contracting context has not significantly changed in 
the almost six decades since the landmark United States v. Reynolds77 decision, de-
spite the privilege’s increased invocation since the end of the Cold War.78 For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court of the United States has only handled one other case regard-
ing the issue of the state secrets privilege in a contractual dispute, Tenet v. Doe,79 in 
which the Court simply reaffirmed its 1875 Totten v. United States80 holding. Lim-
ited case law on the subject exists, at least in part, as lower courts have presumably 
sealed a number of cases on the narrow issue.81 
The state secrets privilege is a well-established exception to the rules of discovery, 
which permits the government to prevent disclosure of certain information pursu-
ant to trial.82 The government may invoke the state secrets privilege whenever the 
“Government has a compelling interest in protecting . . . the secrecy of information 
important to our national security.”83 In Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas 
 73. 30 Fed. Cl. 507, 510–11 (1994). 
 74. Northrop Grumman Corp., Military Aircraft Div. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 12, 17–18 (2004). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 18. 
 77. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 78. Jason A. Crook, From the Civil War to the War on Terror: The Evolution and Application of the State 
Secrets Privilege, 72 ALB. L. REV. 57, 63–66 (2009).  
 79. 544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005). 
 80. 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875). 
 81. Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 79–82 (2010) (discussing diffi-
culties in attempting to understand the use and scope of the state secrets privilege because academic literature 
relies upon published opinions, which represent only a small portion of instances where the state secrets privi-
lege affects the outcome of the case). 
 82. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6–7. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that, with exceptions, parties 
“may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). The government’s privilege to conceal information dates back to at least 1827. Martin v. 
Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 30–31 (1827). 
 83. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (per curiam). 
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Corp., the court held that the government properly invoked its state secrets privilege 
when the defense contractors in a civil suit subpoenaed certain government docu-
ments related to sales of military equipment to foreign governments.84 
United States v. Reynolds85 is the “leading decision” on the state secrets privilege 
to prevent discovery.86 In Reynolds, three civilian contractors died when a B-29 air-
craft crashed during an Air Force test of secret electronic equipment.87 During pre-
trial, the wives of the deceased civilian contractors sought to produce the Air Force’s 
official accident investigation report.88 The Secretary of the Air Force objected to 
revealing such information on national security grounds.89 The Supreme Court held 
that the government has a state secrets privilege to discovery, but that the appropri-
ate court must determine whether the government’s claim of privilege is valid.90 In 
Reynolds, the Supreme Court determined that the government properly invoked its 
state secrets privilege and thus precluded plaintiffs from discovery of privileged in-
formation.91 However, the Supreme Court noted that the state secrets privilege was 
an evidentiary privilege, and as such its invocation did not necessitate the cessation 
of litigation.92 
Today, despite limited case law, the operation of the state secrets privilege is well 
understood. The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege avail-
able only under limited circumstances.93 Only the government may assert the state 
secrets privilege.94 To invoke the state secrets privilege, the government must af-
firmatively assert the privilege; this right cannot be waived.95 To assert the state se-
crets privilege, the head of the relevant government department must issue a formal 
claim of the privilege after “actual personal consideration” of the matter.96 
The court determines whether the government’s claim of privilege is valid.97 
When undertaking its analysis, a court must not reveal the information the privilege 
is designed to protect.98 Courts are forbidden from maintaining any trial that will 
 84. 751 F.2d 395, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 85. 345 U.S. 1. 
 86. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 87. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 4.  
 90. Id. at 6–8. 
 91. Id. at 10–11. 
 92. Id. at 12.  
 93. Id. at 7–8. 
 94. Id at 7. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 7–8; see also Crater Corp. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(holding that “actual personal consideration” was satisfied when a senior officer was informed of a potential 
state secrets privilege issue and made the ultimate policy determination). 
 97. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 at 8. 
 98. Id. 
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inevitably disclose privileged information.99 This rule is “designed not merely to de-
feat the asserted claims, but to preclude judicial inquiry.”100 For example, in Guong 
v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the state se-
crets privilege did not require the government to reveal if the plaintiff was a former 
employee when plaintiff brought a breach of employment contract claim against the 
Central Intelligence Agency.101 
As the state secrets privilege is an evidentiary privilege, its invocation does not al-
ter the basic tenets of interpretation of government contracts. Interpretation of gov-
ernment contracts — including remedies — is normally governed by contract law, 
unless a statutory exception exists.102 The Contracts Dispute Act, the relevant part 
presently codified as 41 U.S.C. § 7103, governs the government contracting disputes 
process.103 
Under 41 U.S.C. § 7103, a government contractor must submit a contract claim 
against the federal government to the Contracting Officer for a decision.104 The 
Contracting Officer must issue a written decision that is furnished to the contrac-
tor,105 and the decision must state the Contracting Officer’s reasons for his or her 
decision — although no specific findings of fact are required.106 The Contracting Of-
ficer’s decision on a claim is “final and conclusive . . . unless an appeal or action is 
timely commenced.”107 The Federal Acquisition Regulations System,108 and in perti-
nent part the Defense Acquisition Regulations System,109 details how remedy dam-
ages are to be calculated.110 
Under general contracts common law, “a party has no claim in restitution for 
performance that he has rendered under or in return for a promise that is unen-
forceable on grounds of public policy unless denial of restitution would cause dis-
 99. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875). 
 100. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6–7 n.4 (2005). 
 101. 860 F.2d 1063, 1066–67 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 102. See Franconia Associates v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 141 (2002); Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 
U.S. 407, 411 (1947). 
 103. See Contracts Dispute Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978), Section 6(b); 41 U.S.C. § 
7103 (Supp. V. 2012). 
 104. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a). 
 105. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(d). 
 106. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(e). 
 107. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(g). The language of the statute is substantially the same as when it was first codified. 
Compare Contracts Dispute Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, § 6(b), 92 Stat. 2383, 2384--85 (1978), with 41 
U.S.C. § 7103(g). The Contracts Dispute Act of 1978 was specifically enacted to enhance the government’s bar-
gaining position. S. REP. NO. 95--1118, at 1 (1978). 
 108. 48 C.F.R. tit. 28 (2011) (Federal Acquisition Regulations System). 
 109. 48 C.F.R. §§ 201–253 (2011) (Defense Acquisition Regulations System). 
 110. For sections relevant to termination of a fixed-price contract, see 48 C.F.R. § 52.249–2 (2011) (Termi-
nation for Convenience of the Government (Fixed-Price)); 48 C.F.R. § 52.249–9 (2011) (Default (Fixed-Price 
Research and Development)). 
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proportionate forfeiture.”111 If a court is unable to enforce a contract due to a public 
policy exception, the court’s remedy is to leave the parties as it found them.112 
IV. The Court’s Reasoning 
In General Dynamics, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the parties are to 
be left as the court found them when the government properly invokes its state se-
crets privilege and, as a result, the government is unable to adequately respond to a 
contractor’s prima facie valid superior knowledge claim.113 
As a preliminary matter, the Court assumed two prior findings by the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Courts of Federal Claims.114 First, govern-
ment contractors properly raised the superior knowledge defense to the govern-
ment’s assertion that the contractor breached the contract.115 Second, the govern-
ment validly invoked its state secrets privilege, thereby preventing further discovery 
of particular information.116 
The Court made four key determinations as well as an important conclusion in 
dicta. The Court first determined that the appropriate remedy is governed by con-
tract common law.117 Second, the Court reasoned that, under the circumstances, 
neither party could obtain judicial relief.118 Third, the Court concluded that under 
contract common law, when neither party may obtain judicial relief, the appropri-
ate remedy is for the court to leave the parties as it found them.119 Fourth, the Court 
determined that the position of the parties when they filed suit was the actual pos-
session of funds and property of the parties at the time the suit was filed, instead of 
the legal obligations of the parties at the time the suit was filed.120 Finally, in dicta, 
the Court asserted that the purpose of the holding was to provide incentive for par-
ties to contract around future situations where the government would invoke its 
state secrets privilege.121 
 111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 (1981).  
 112. Id. at cmt. a (“In general, if a court will not, on grounds of public policy, aid a promisee by enforcing 
the promise, it will not aid him by granting him restitution for performance that he has rendered in return for 
the unenforceable promise. Neither will it aid the promisor by allowing a claim in restitution for performance 
that he has rendered under the unenforceable promise. It will simply leave both parties as it finds them, even 
though this may result in one of them retaining a benefit that he has received as a result of the transaction.”). 
The Court’s interpretation of “as it finds them” is one of the principle holdings of General Dynamics. See infra 
Part IV. 
 113. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1906 (2011). Justice Scalia wrote the opinion 
for the unanimous majority. Id. at 1903. 
 114. See id. at 1904–06. 
 115. See id.  
 116. See id.  
 117. Id. at 1906. 
 118. Id. at 1907. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1908. 
 121. Id. at 1909–10. 
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First, the Court reasoned that the appropriate remedy in such a case is deter-
mined by contract common law instead of by the state secrets privilege.122 The Court 
determined that the lower courts had improperly relied upon United States v. Reyn-
olds.123 The Court differentiated between Reynolds and the present case by noting 
that Reynolds “decided a purely evidentiary dispute by applying evidentiary rules,” 
whereas in the present case the lower court had “decreed the substantive result” 
even though the contractors were able to establish a prima facie case.124 
Second, the Court reasoned that “[w]here liability depends upon the validity of a 
plausible superior-knowledge defense, and when full litigation of that defense 
[would lead to disclosure of state secrets], neither party can obtain judicial relief.”125 
The Court agreed with the lower court’s legal and factual determinations, specifical-
ly noting that prior disclosures of state secrets had already taken place and further 
disclosures might result if discovery were to continue.126 However, the Court disa-
greed with the lower courts application of the legal determination.127 The Court rea-
soned that because “[i]t is claims and defenses together that establish [justification 
for] judicial relief . . . when public policy precludes judicial intervention for the one 
it should preclude judicial intervention for the other as well,” allowing the claim to 
proceed would provide a windfall to one litigant.128 
Third, the Court determined that the appropriate remedy when neither party 
may obtain judicial relief was to follow the common law, which is for the court to 
“leave both parties as it finds them.”129 The concern of the Court was to ensure that 
neither litigant gained an unfair advantage from the necessary exclusion of infor-
mation due to invocation of the state secrets privilege, despite the claim being non-
justiciable.130 The Court further reasoned that the Statute of Frauds131 supported its 
 122. Id. at 1906. 
 123. Id. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) (holding defendant-government may invoke 
the state secrets privilege to prevent the plaintiff from discovering confidential information without having to 
abandon a legal defense dependent upon concealed information, when widows of Air Force pilots killed in a 
testing of a secret aircraft sought an accident report). 
 124. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 1906. 
 125. Id. at 1907. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 1907–08 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 cmt. (a) (1981) (“In general, if a 
court will not, on grounds of public policy, aid a promisee by enforcing the promise, it will not aid him by 
granting him restitution for performance that he has rendered in return for the unenforceable promise. Neither 
will it aid the promisor by allowing a claim in restitution for performance that he has rendered under the unen-
forceable promise. It will simply leave both parties as it finds them, even though this may result in one of them 
retaining a benefit that he has received as a result of the transaction.”)). 
 131. The Statute of Frauds is a common law doctrine that requires a written instrument for certain agree-
ments so as to “prevent ‘contracts’ from being falsely sworn upon those who had never assented to them.” 1 
HAWKLAND UCC SERIES § 2-201:1 (quotes in original). The Statute of Frauds is separate from government con-
tracting fraud or abuse claims, none of which were raised in General Dynamics. See supra Part II. For a discus-
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view, as it “assumes a valid, enforceable agreement between the parties but never-
theless leaves them without a remedy absent reliable evidence” due to fear of possi-
ble injustice.132 In other words, the Court reasoned that although the government 
has the right to invoke its state secrets privilege, it will not be rewarded for doing 
so.133 The Court concluded that since the contractors were able to present a prima 
facie case and the government could not provide a defense because it invoked the 
state secrets privilege, it would be unfair to presume that the government should 
win the claim by default.134 
Fourth, the Court determined that the “position of the parties” at the time the 
suit was filed was “not their position with regard to legal burdens and the legal con-
sequences of contract-related determinations, but with regard to possession of 
funds and property.”135 The Court first reasoned that, although it did not hold a 
view on the merits of the issue, because the issue was nonjusticiable, equitable con-
cerns mandated that the government not unduly benefit from an unfair default 
rule.136 The Court determined that it would be impossible to calculate damages from 
the contract termination, given that the information necessary to make such a de-
termination was privileged.137 The Court believed that it was obligated to enforce 
what the “ex ante expectations of the parties were or reasonably ought to have 
been.”138 However, because both parties must have understood that “state secrets 
would prevent courts from resolving many possible disputes” under the contract, 
the parties assumed the risk of the courts being unable to enforce the contract.139 
The Court concluded that since the parties wholly assumed the risk of an unen-
forceable contract, and because the court did not have a knowledgeable basis to cor-
rect the issue, the parties were to be left in the position with regard to possession of 
funds and property at the time of the start of litigation.140 
The Court explained that its holding did not include the Contracting Officer’s 
determination of fault.141 The Court reasoned that the Contracting Officer’s verdict 
sion of government contracting fraud or abuse claims, see generally Jeffrey L. Handwerker et. al., Congress De-
clares Checkmate: How the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 Strengthens the Civil False Claims Act and 
Counters the Courts, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 295 (2010). 
 132. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 1908. 
 133. Id. at 1907–08. 
 134. Id. at 1906. 
 135. Id. at 1908. 
 136. See id. 
 137. Id. Because the issue was nonjusticiable, the Court determined that 48 C.F.R. § 52.249–2 was not appli-
cable when determining the costs owed by the litigants. Id.  
 138. Id. at 1909. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. at 1908. 
 141. Id. Pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 605, since recodified as 41 U.S.C. § 7103(g), “the contracting officer’s deci-
sion on a claim is final and conclusive . . . unless an appeal or action is timely commenced as authorized by this 
chapter.” 41 U.S.C. § 7103(g) (Supp. V. 2012). In Gen. Dynamics Corp., if the Contracting Officer’s determina-
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was not binding because that decision was “merely one step in the contractual re-
gime to which the parties had agreed,” and as such would not be a final decision if 
litigation was pursued.142 
The Court determined that the position of the parties at the time of the start of 
litigation was that the contractor had spent $3.88 billion and the government had 
paid $2.68 billion.143 Given that the parties were left as they stood at the time of liti-
gation, the parties did not owe obligations to one another.144 
Finally, in dicta, the Court asserted that the purpose of the holding was to pro-
vide incentive for parties to contract around future situations where the govern-
ment would invoke its state secrets privilege.145 The Court believed that it attained 
this goal by rendering the “law more predictable and hence more subject to ac-
commodation by contracting parties.”146 Specifically, the Court explained that the 
purpose of the opinion was to provide greater incentive for the government and 
government contractors to contract around similar types of situations in the fu-
ture.147 In response to the government’s concern that a new legal standard would 
give litigants incentive to file frivolous superior knowledge defense claims, the 
Court characterized such fears as “misplaced.”148 The Court reasoned so because it 
believed that (1) the holding would only apply in a very narrow set of circumstanc-
es, where the contractor is able to present a prima facie case despite the govern-
ment’s valid use of its state secrets privilege, (2) defense contractors have incentive 
not to abuse the system since they are repeat employees, and (3) further legal re-
finement could remedy issues that would arise.149 The Court concluded that courts 
should be hesitant to invoke this holding, given that it is the “option of last resort, 
available in a very narrow set of circumstances.”150 
The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
and remanded.151 
V. Analysis 
In General Dynamics v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the parties are to 
be left as the court found them when the government properly invokes its state se-
tion that the contractor had defaulted was upheld, the contractor would have been required to repay the gov-
ernment $1.35 billion. See 131 S. Ct. at 1903–04.  
 142. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 1908.  
 143. Id. at 1903. 
 144. Id. at 1909. 
 145. Id. at 1909–10. 
 146. Id. at 1909. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 1910. 
 151. Id. 
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crets privilege and, as a result, the government is unable to adequately respond to a 
contractor’s prima facie valid superior knowledge claim.152 Although the Court’s 
holding appears to be a practical solution to reduce litigation involving the state se-
crets privilege, it is likely to lead to more litigation over the state secrets privilege.153 
Moreover, given that the Court determined the claim was nonjusticiable, the Court 
should have dismissed the claim, as opposed to issuing a holding that changed prec-
edent.154 Instead, the Court should have affirmed the Court of Federal Claims ruling 
that the appropriate remedy under the circumstances was to leave the parties as 
they were when litigation commenced — bound by the contractual agreement that 
the Contracting Officer’s determination would be binding unless an appropriate 
court adjudicated otherwise.155 To remedy the current situation, Congress should 
pass legislation to restore the prior precedent that relied upon the Contracting Of-
ficer’s determination.156 
This analysis section posits that the Court’s holding and purpose that the Court 
used to justify that holding appear to be at odds.157 The Court states its desire to re-
duce litigation over the state secrets privilege.158 However, the Court’s holding will 
likely increase litigation over the state secrets privilege because the holding, along 
with changes in the defense industrial market, raise the government’s expected val-
ue for litigating defense acquisition claims.159 The Court’s holding — to leave the 
parties as they were with regard to the actual possession of funds and property of 
the parties at the time the suit was filed when a claim is nonjusticiable due to the 
invocation of the state secrets privilege under specific circumstances — is unlikely 
to result in decreased use of the state secrets privilege for two reasons.160 First, the 
holding discourages the government from contracting around the state secrets 
privilege because current circumstances indicate that the DoD will very likely be 
able to invoke the state secrets privilege and, even if a defense contractor could pro-
vide evidence of a prima facie valid superior knowledge claim despite that privilege, 
the DoD — because of the habitual overruns in defense contracting — will likely be 
able to present enough evidence to render the claim nonjusticiable.161 Second, the 
holding will likely fail to undermine the incentive of defense contractors to litigate 
because their expected values of litigation will still be high, even though they are less 
likely to succeed.162 Overall, it is likely that the Court’s holding establishes a new sta-
 152. Id. at 1906. 
 153. See infra Part V.A. 
 154. See infra Part V.B. 
 155. See infra Part V.B. 
 156. See infra Part V.C. 
 157. See infra Part V.A.1. 
 158. See infra Part V.A.1. 
 159. See infra Part V.A.1. 
 160. See infra Part V.A. 
 161. See infra Parts V.A.2–3. 
 162. See infra Part V.A.4. 
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tus quo that provides strong incentive for the DoD to litigate certain claims but fails 
to undermine the incentive of defense contractors to litigate, thereby increasing in-
stances of litigation.163 
A. Although the Court’s Holding, on Its Face, Appears to Be a Practical Way to Reduce 
Litigation Involving the State Secrets Privilege, It Is Likely to Lead to More Litigation 
over the State Secrets Privilege 
The Court’s stated purpose in General Dynamics is to ensure that privileged state 
secrets are not revealed through discovery at trial.164 The Court believes that it 
achieved its goal by holding that the contracting parties assume the risk of an unen-
forceable contract when the parties should have reasonably foreseen the possibility 
of a nonjusticiable claim arising out of the government’s use of its state secrets 
privilege.165 By requiring the parties to assume the risk of an unenforceable contract, 
the Court believes that the parties will have strong incentive to contract around 
such foreseeable issues in the future.166 For this reason, the Court states that the 
holding itself is of minor importance because it will only be applicable in very lim-
ited circumstances.167 
On its face, the Supreme Court’s logic appears sound. In situations where parties 
are contracting for the development of a classified military system,168 the parties 
should reasonably foresee the possibility that a contract dispute could not be re-
solved through the courts due to the risk that litigation would reveal state secrets. 
Further, the Supreme Court’s opinion addresses the issue in a seemingly elegant 
manner, by purporting to change the incentive structure of the parties to avoid liti-
gation in the future.169 
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s expectations, however, the General Dynamics 
holding is likely to lead to more litigation over the state secrets privilege. An under-
standing of bargaining power and how the defense industry operates are crucial to 
understanding why the Supreme Court’s expectations are unlikely to be met.170 The 
General Dynamics holding provides the government with the ability and incentive 
to abuse its holding, does not provide the parties with sufficient incentive to con-
tract around the issue, does not sufficiently dissuade contractors from pursuing 
 163. See infra Part V.A. 
 164. See Gen. Dynamics Corp v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1909–10 (2011). This statement is consistent 
with prior precedent. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 
7–8 (1953). 
 165. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 1909. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 1910. 
 168. Id. at 1909. As noted by the Court, even the “contract itself was a classified document at one point.” Id.  
 169. Id.  
 170. See infra Part V.A.1. 
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cancelled contracts through litigation, and the Court’s holding is ultimately at odds 
with its purpose in the present case.171 
1. Context: Bargaining Power and How the Defense Industry Operates Today 
Two concepts are important to understanding how the General Dynamics holding is 
likely to impact the defense industry: the concept of bargaining power and the cur-
rent state of the defense acquisition market. 
a. Bargaining Power 
The first concept, bargaining power, is important to understand why, and in what 
ways, default rules — including both statutory rules and judicial holdings — will 
impact actors negotiating a contract. In short, default rules, which establish the fall 
back position if parties have not contracted for such a contingency, affect bargain-
ing power, and thus outcomes, by altering the expectations and legal rights of the 
parties.172 
A bargain is, in effect, a contest in which each party uses its power in an attempt 
to obtain a preferred outcome in a transaction.173 In most situations, the preferred 
outcome is either receiving the desired product or service at the best price or other-
wise capturing a greater share of the surplus generated by the transaction.174 De-
pending upon the circumstances, however, a party’s preferred outcome may be to 
not conclude a transaction — namely, when the potential cost exceeds the per-
ceived value of the transaction.175 
The ability to obtain one’s preferred outcome is referred to as bargaining pow-
er.176 Bargaining power is an indefinite term, but generally refers to the desire and 
power a party may marshal in the transaction so as to obtain the “greatest possible 
value from the other party at an exchange price equal to or less than their respective 
reserve prices.”177 Differences in bargaining power exist for a multitude of reasons.178 
Relative bargaining power depends upon the situation, but may include factors as 
disparate as personal preferences, information asymmetry,179 market structure, ne-
gotiating skill, as well as legal rights and default rules.180 
 171. See infra Parts V.A.2–5. 
 172. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 169–71 (2005).  
 173. Id. at 160. 
 174. Id. at 169. 
 175. See id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 169–72. 
 179. Information asymmetry refers to a situation where one party has more knowledge about a situation 
than the other party, and so the first party can leverage the difference in knowledge to gain a strategic advantage 
in the bargaining process. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 488–90 (1970). The classic example of this situation is a customer haggling for a 
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Legally established default rules — determined by the legislature and judiciary — 
affect how contracts will be written by altering the initial bargaining position of the 
parties.181 Specifically, default rules shift legal power in a way that may not have oc-
curred but for the legally mandated default rule.182 Default rules may be very im-
portant in that they “not only reflect the typical expectations of the parties . . . but 
also mold and shape them.”183 Not only are default rules likely to influence the bar-
gaining positions of the parties, but the mere establishment of a default rule is likely 
to alter the substantive preferences of the contracting parties due to the status quo 
bias — all else being equal, contracting parties prefer the status quo to alternative 
positions.184 By establishing a new default rule that alters the outcome of nonjustici-
able cases from a “tie” where the Contracting Officer’s determination is final to a 
government “win” by leaving the parties with the assets possessed at the time trial 
commences, General Dynamics has significantly increased the bargaining power of 
the government at the expense of the defense contractors.185 
b. How the Defense Industry Operates Today 
The second major concept necessary to properly comprehend the likely impact of 
the General Dynamics holding is to understand three vital trends in the current de-
fense acquisition system. First, “[o]ne of the major changes taking place today in 
government management (federal, state, and local) is the shift from the government 
as the historic ‘provider’ of public services to the government as the ‘manager of the 
providers’ of services to the public.”186 This shift has been particularly pronounced 
for the Department of Defense (DoD), which has outsourced its ability to develop 
new weapon systems internally.187 Reflecting this trend, the DoD lost sixty percent 
of its acquisition workforce — approximately 300,000 employees — between 1990 
and 2006, even though the workforce’s workload increased significantly due to 
new car, at a point in time prior to when the customer can properly determine if the car is defective (or, a “lem-
on”). Id. 
 180. See Barnhizer, supra note 172, at 166, 169–72. 
 181. See Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 396, 396 (2009). 
 182. See Barnhizer, supra note 172, at 169–71.  
 183. Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
1710, 1759 (1997). 
 184. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 611 (1998). 
 185. See infra Parts V.A.2–3. 
 186. JACQUES S. GANSLER, MOVING TOWARD MARKET-BASED GOVERNMENT: THE CHANGING ROLE OF 
GOVERNMENT AS THE PROVIDER 6 (IBM Endowment for the Business of Government, 2003), available at 
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/MarketBasedGovernment.pdf (emphasis and paren-
thesis in original). 
 187. JACQUES S. GANSLER ET AL., ACHIEVING THE DESIRED STRUCTURE OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY IN THE 21
ST
 
CENTURY 51 (Naval Postgraduate Sch., Acquisition Research Program No. UMD-AM-08-125, 2008) [hereinaf-
ter DEFENSE INDUSTRY]. 
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post-9/11 spending.188 Consequently, the DoD has grown increasingly reliant upon 
government contractors to provide needed acquisition capacity and will remain so 
for the foreseeable future.189 Given the DoD’s increasing reliance on contractors for 
acquisition services,190 the DoD is likely to encounter a rising number of contracting 
issues in the near future. 
Second, the defense industry has experienced significant consolidation since the 
end of the Cold War, shrinking from approximately fifty defense contractors to the 
six primary firms that operate today.191 The defense industry undertook this consol-
idation at the request of the DoD, in large part due to recognition that defense 
budgets could not sustain the size of the industry.192 Given defense contractors’ de-
pendence upon DoD spending, each defense acquisition contract is very important 
to each defense contractor.193 In practice, defense acquisition firms have distorted 
incentives to bid low in order to receive initial bids that allow them to remain 
“locked in” when optimistic expectations are unrealized and significant cost growth 
occurs.194 DoD continuously buys into the defense contractor’s optimistic expecta-
tions in part because it cannot afford more consolidation or else it will lose any 
chance of competition for future defense acquisition projects.195 Consequently, DoD 
often awards acquisition contracts to firms that promise the most performance at 
the lowest cost, regardless of true feasibility,196 and so many defense acquisition con-
tracts incur significant deficiencies that justify termination for cause. 
Third, government contractors have historically experienced significant prob-
lems in developing new defense acquisition weapons, and such difficulties are likely 
to persist into the future.197 Between the 1960s and the 1990s, Major Defense Acqui-
 188. Id. at 50. In 2010, the Secretary of Defense declared that rebuilding the capacity of the acquisition 
workforce was a strategic priority. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-232T, ACQUISITION 
WORKFORCE: DOD’S EFFORTS TO REBUILD CAPACITY HAVE SHOWN SOME PROGRESS 1–2 (2011). However, the 
DoD only plans to increase the acquisition workforce by 20,000 positions by fiscal year 2015. Id. at 3. 
 189. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-572T, DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: DOD NEEDS 
TO REEXAMINE ITS EXTENSIVE RELIANCE ON CONTRACTORS AND CONTINUE TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT AND 
OVERSIGHT 1–2 (2008).  
 190. See id. at 1. 
 191. DEFENSE INDUSTRY, supra note 187, at 15–17. The six firms are Lockheed Martin Corporation, The 
Boeing Company, Northrop Grumman Corporation, General Dynamics Corporation, Raytheon Company and 
BAE Systems Inc. Id. at 17. 
 192. See id. Only Boeing generates significant non-defense revenues, although defense sales represented 
forty-seven percent of its revenues in 2011. THE BOEING COMPANY, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT ii–iii, 3 (2012). 
 193. JACQUES S. GANSLER ET AL., COMPETITION IN DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS 15 (Naval Postgraduate Sch., Ac-
quisition Research Program No. UMD-AM-09-001, 2009) [hereinafter COMPETITION IN DEFENSE 
ACQUISITIONS]. 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. at 11–12. 
 196. Id. at 15. 
 197. See JACQUES S. GANSLER ET AL., THE EFFECT OF THE NUNN-MCCURDY AMENDMENT ON UNIT COST 
GROWTH OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROJECTS viii–ix (Naval Postgraduate Sch., Acquisition Research Program 
No. UMD-AM-10-155, 2010) [hereinafter NUNN-MCCURDY]. 
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sition Projects (MDAPs)198 averaged greater than fifty percent unit cost growth 
when compared to programs’ original baselines.199 Cost growth may have improved 
recently, but MDAPs currently under development are experiencing average cost 
growth of forty percent over the programs’ original baselines.200 Recent legislative 
changes,201 along with high cost growth and a likely fall in defense spending in the 
near future, may result in a greater number of defense projects being cancelled. 
Thus, there will likely be an increasing number of defense contractors filing lawsuits 
in response to the cancellation of defense acquisition contracts. 
Finally, DoD spending on MDAPs in the near future is likely to be significantly 
constrained by the stagnation or decrease in military spending along with the rise in 
mandatory costs such as health care202 — trends that will likely lead to the cancelling 
of more defense contracts. 
Overall, while DoD has become reliant upon a small number of defense con-
tracting firms to provide it with new weapons systems, future projected budget con-
straints on DoD spending will likely cause more defense acquisition contracts to be 
cancelled. As a result, defense acquisition contracting is likely to become an increas-
ingly contentious legal area — in part due to changes in the defense market and in 
part due to General Dynamics. 
2. The General Dynamics Holding Provides the Government with the Ability and In-
centive to Terminate Most MDAP Contracts at the Fault of the Contractor 
The government could abuse the General Dynamics holding easily because the Gen-
eral Dynamics holding raises the government’s expected value for litigating defense 
acquisition claims. The government has the ability to abuse the holding because the 
majority of MDAPs experience significant development difficulties, and every 
 198. Major Defense Acquisition Projects are programs that exceed either $365 million in development costs 
or $2,190 million in procurement costs when measured in fiscal year 2000 dollars. OBAID YOUNOSSI, ET. AL., IS 
WEAPON SYSTEM COST GROWTH INCREASING?: A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF COMPLETE AND ONGOING 
PROGRAMS 9 (Rand Project Air Force, 2007). MDAPs represent roughly eighty percent of DoD’s acquisition 
spending in a given year. Id. 
 199. NUNN-MCCURDY, supra note 197, at 9. Unit cost growth is calculated by the formula: (new baseline 
unit cost – original baseline unit cost) / original baseline unit cost * 100. See id at vi. For example, if the DoD 
originally estimated that the X tank would cost $1 million per tank but ultimately acquired the tank at $1.5 mil-
lion per tank, X tank would have experienced unit cost growth of fifty percent over the original baseline esti-
mate.  
 200. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-400SP, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: ASSESSMENTS OF 
SELECTED WEAPON PROGRAMS 171 (2012).  
 201. NUNN-MCCURDY, supra note 197, at 23. The Nunn-McCurdy Amendment, as amended by the Major 
Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, requires cancellation of MDAPs that exceed specified unit-
cost growth metrics unless the program’s costs are certified as reasonable and supported by an independent cost 
estimate. Id.  
 202. See CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, RESTORING TRICARE: ENSURING THE LONG TERM VIABILITY OF THE 
MILITARY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 1 (2011).  
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MDAP includes some state secrets.203 Consequently, the government has ample op-
portunity to terminate a large number of MDAP contracts for fault of the contrac-
tor and reasonably rely on the state secrets privilege being properly invoked. The 
government also has an incentive to abuse the holding because it typically pays for 
development contracts in installment payments204 that are contingent upon speci-
fied contractor performance. Thus, the government can strategically cancel pro-
grams shortly before installment payments are due in order to avoid costly losses, as 
shown in the General Dynamics205 case. 
After General Dynamics, the government has less to fear from litigation because 
it must pay the contractor for additional incurred costs only when it is both unable 
to invoke its state secrets privilege and loses on the merits in court.206 In other 
words, the General Dynamics holding has changed the “tie” situation of a nonjusti-
ciable issue being decided by a Contracting Officer — who, for various reasons, was 
likely to split costs — to a “win” for the government because it would not have to 
repay the contractor for costs incurred since the last payment date. 
3. The General Dynamics Holding Discourages the Government from Contracting 
Around State Secrets Issues 
The General Dynamics holding does not provide the parties with incentive to con-
tract around state secrets issues in the future because government contractors do 
not have sufficient leverage to change the government’s behavior. Under General 
Dynamics, the parties are left in the position with regard to actual possession of 
funds and property at the time of the start of litigation.207 Although the Supreme 
Court believes this holding will provide parties incentive to contract around the po-
tential for the state secrets privilege rendering a claim nonjusticiable,208 the holding 
is unlikely to achieve the Court’s goal for two reasons. First, the DoD is a monopso-
ny209 buyer that wields considerable market power.210 As each government contrac-
tor is reliant almost exclusively on government contracts to survive, each individual 
government contractor has little power to negotiate in order to counterbalance the 
government’s negotiating strength.211 Second, defense contractors have strong in-
 203. See supra Part V.A.1.a. The DoD’s only countervailing interest is the desire to maintain enough firms in 
the defense industry to maintain at least the possibility of competition. See supra Part V.A.1.a.  
 204. The government’s preferred contract type is fixed-price. 48 C.F.R. § 16.104 (2011). 
 205. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 358, 365–66 (1996). 
 206. See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1907 (2011). 
 207. Id. at 1908. 
 208. Id. at 1909. 
 209. A monopsony is a market in which only one buyer and more than one seller exist. Jay M. Zitter, What 
Constitutes Monopsony Within Meaning of § 2 of Sherman Act, 49 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 515 (2010). 
 210. COMPETITION IN DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS, supra note 193, at 11. 
 211. Id. at 5–12. A defense contractor will have to rely upon less discrete bargaining chips, namely the need 
for national security, the desire to preserve the defense contractor industry, and the potential release of state 
secrets through litigation. See id.  
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centive to negotiate terms favorable to the government to secure the first contract, 
or else lose the opportunity to achieve tens of billions of dollars in revenue.212 Given 
the desire to reach an agreement, the contractor is unlikely to raise the state secrets 
privilege given the small likelihood of the event. Overall, the Supreme Court’s belief 
that the parties will have incentive to contract around nonjusticiable claims because 
of the state secrets privilege is unrealistic. 
4. Even Though the General Dynamics Holding Reduces the Likelihood of Contractors 
Prevailing in a Contract Dispute of this Nature, the Holding is Unlikely to Reduce the 
Probability that Contractors Will Litigate 
Although defense contractors are less likely to prevail under the General Dynamics 
holding than under prior case law, they still have significant incentive to litigate 
terminated contracts. The expected value of contesting a cancelled defense contract 
will still almost always be worth a defense contractor’s time and money because, 
even though the probability of success is low and the firm will incur litigation costs, 
the potential reward is extremely high213 — likely a billion dollars or more. Potential 
rewards are even higher as the total lifecycle costs of most MDAPs runs into the tens 
of billions of dollars.214 Even with a decreased probability of success after General 
Dynamics, the expected value is still likely to considerably exceed the costs and risks 
of litigation. Although insufficient evidence is available to make a scientific deter-
mination regarding expected value, the anecdotal evidence that a defense contractor 
has been willing to litigate with the government for over 20 years in hopes of re-
trieving one billion dollars in costs lends credence to the belief that contractors are 
likely to have strong incentives to continue to litigate government contracts even 
after the ruling of General Dynamics.215 
5. The Court’s Holding and Purpose that the Court Used to Justify the Holding Appear 
to Be at Odds in the Present Case 
The Court’s holding and purpose that the Court used to justify the holding appear 
to be at odds in the present case. The Court’s holding required courts to leave the 
parties as they are found when the state secrets privilege prevents full judicial reso-
lution of a dispute and asserted that the express purpose of the holding was to pro-
vide clear expectations for parties so that they could contract around such scenarios 
 212. See supra Part V.A.1.  
 213. See YOUNOSSI, supra note 198, at 9. This phenomenon is amplified given that only a few MDAP con-
tracts are issued each year, making each bid process very competitive. See OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE (ACQUISITION RESOURCES AND ANALYSIS), SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORTS (SAR) SUMMARY TABLES AS 
OF DATE DECEMBER 31, 2011 2 (2012), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/SST-2011-12.pdf.  
 214. See generally U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-400SP, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: 
ASSESSMENTS OF SELECTED WEAPON PROGRAMS (2012). 
 215. See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011). 
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in the future.216 However, the United States Congress had already passed a rule to 
deal with the issue of breach of a public contract: the “contracting officer’s decision 
on a claim is final and conclusive . . . unless an appeal or action is timely com-
menced as authorized by this chapter”217 Given that the claim was dismissed,218 the 
Contracting Officer’s decision should have been binding. 
The Supreme Court argues that this statute was not binding because the Con-
tracting Officer’s decision was “merely one step in the contractual regime to which 
the parties had agreed,” and as such would not constitute the final decision if litiga-
tion was pursued.219 The Supreme Court does not analyze and develop in detail, 
however, why the nonjusticiability of the claim rose to such a level that equitable 
notions necessitated a change in precedent. 
Given that the nonjusticiability of an issue means that the claim is not fit for ju-
dicial determination,220 it is not logically clear why the Contracting Officer’s deci-
sion is not considered final and binding. The parties expected, or should have ex-
pected, the possibility that a judicial claim could not be resolved through the courts, 
and hence should have relied upon the federal rule as the default rule. Thus, the 
parties should have already had clear expectations regarding the outcome of a non-
justiciable claim: the Contracting Officer’s determination is final unless an appro-
priate judicial appeal reaches a different conclusion on the merits.221 Although the 
General Dynamics holding provides an equally bright line rule for courts to follow, 
it is unclear why the equitable injustice was so great so as for the Court to establish a 
new remedy standard. 
B. The Supreme Court Should Have Affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ Ruling that 
Left the Parties Bound by the Contracting Officer’s Determination Instead of Issuing a 
Decision that, in Effect, Determined the Merits of a Claim Deemed to be Nonjusticiable 
Although the Court deemed that the superior knowledge issue was nonjusticiable,222 
the Court nonetheless called upon its equitable authority to issue a holding that 
changed the outcome of the case.223 In other words, the Court declared that even 
though it did not have the authority to determine the case on the merits, it would 
nonetheless circumvent the merits to issue a holding that did impact the outcome.224 
The Court’s attempt to claim that the holding would have an effect on the outcome 
 216. Id. at 1909. 
 217. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(g) (Supp. V. 2012). 
 218. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 1908. 
 219. Id. 
 220. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 906 (9th ed. abridged 2010). 
 221. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(g). 
 222. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 1908–09. 
 223. Id. at 1908. 
 224. See id.  
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of the parties, but no affect because such was in line with ex ante expectations,225 ap-
pears disingenuous. 
Given that the Court determined the sole claim of the appeal was nonjusticia-
ble,226 the Court should not have issued a decision that implicitly determined the 
merits of the case. Black’s law dictionary defines nonjusticiable as “not proper for 
judicial determination.”227 The concepts of justiciability have developed to identify 
appropriate instances for judicial action, acknowledging that judicial power is lim-
ited by both the Constitution and self-imposed prudential principles.228 Specific are-
as recognized as nonjusticiable include “advisory opinions, feigned and collusive 
cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions, and administrative ques-
tions.”229 Although a claim of nonjusticiability does not “wholly and immediately 
foreclos[e]” consideration of a matter, judicial inquiry — and judicial reach — is 
cut off upon a court’s determination of nonjusticiability.230 Specifically, several cir-
cuits have previously held that dismissal is the appropriate remedy when the state 
secrets privilege is properly invoked and continuance of the lawsuit would threaten 
to disclose privileged information.231 
In the present case, the Court explicitly states the single claim of the case is non-
justiciable due to invocation of the state secrets privilege.232 Nonetheless, the Court 
declares that it has the discretion, as an equity court, to issue a holding that affects 
the outcome of the case.233 However, the Court does not adequately explain why its 
use of equitable authority was justified in a situation where it determined that the 
only claim in the case represented a nonjusticiable issue, aside from the argument 
that the Court, as an equitable court, has a duty to prevent injustice.234 The reader is 
left to wonder why the Court can declare that it is unable to determine the merits of 
the case due to a nonjusticiable claim, but nonetheless issues a new framework235 
that will, in effect, step in for the merits to create a new regime with different results 
than would have occurred but for the Court’s intervention. 
 225. Id. at 1909.  
 226. Id. at 1908. 
 227. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 906 (9th ed. abridged 2010). 
 228. 13 FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3529 (3d ed.). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198–99 (1962).  
 231. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal, when 
plaintiffs alleged torture under the Central Intelligence Agency’s extraordinary rendition program); El-Masri v. 
United States, 479 F.3d 296, 306, 313 (4th Cir. 2007) (same); Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 
1140 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal, when plaintiffs alleged defectively manufactured and designed weap-
on system resulted in death and injuries). 
 232. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 1908. 
 233. Id. at 1906. 
 234. See id. at 1908. 
 235. See id. 
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Instead, the Court should have affirmed the holding of the Court of Federal 
Claims, which held that the Contracting Officer’s decision was final as long as that 
decision itself was valid.236 Both of those holdings rested on the simple notion that 
the parties assumed, or reasonably should have assumed, the risk that the contract 
they entered into may not be enforceable due to the nature of the transaction.237 
Given that the parties assumed the risk that a court may be unable to adjudicate the 
claim, and that the parties understood that the Contracting Officer’s decision is “fi-
nal and conclusive” unless overruled by an appropriate judgment on appeal,238 the 
parties expected, or should have expected, the Contracting Officer’s decision to be 
binding. 
The A-12 contract provides additional circumstantial evidence that the parties 
assumed the risk of a claim being deemed nonjusticiable. As noted by the Court, the 
agreement “authorizes a court to convert a default termination into a termination 
for convenience only if it ‘determine[s] that the Contractor was not in default, or 
that the default was excusable.’”239 In this case, the Court did not make such a de-
termination.240 Moreover, the parties had the opportunity to contract around the 
plausible scenario that the state secrets privilege would cause a legal claim to be 
nonjusticiable but chose not to do so.241 Instead, the parties agreed, or reasonably 
should have assumed that they had agreed, to be bound by 41 U.S.C. § 7103, which 
stipulates that for all government contracts the Contracting Officer’s decision on a 
claim is final unless judicial action determines a different outcome.242 
C. To Remedy the Current Situation, Congress Should Pass Legislation to Restore Prior 
Precedent 
Given the imbalance in bargaining power created by the General Dynamics decision, 
and the potential destabilizing effect upon the defense industry,243 Congress should 
resolve the issue promptly via legislative reform. Specifically, Congress should 
amend 41 U.S.C. § 7103(g) by inserting, after the sentence ending “chapter,” this 
 236. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 385, 388 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (holding that the Con-
tracting Officer’s determination of termination due to contractor default met the Lisbon standard, that “there 
was no reasonable likelihood that the contractor[s] could perform the entire contract effort within the time 
remaining for contract performance” (quoting Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 828 F.2d 759, 765 
(Fed. Cir. 1987))). 
 237. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 1909. 
 238. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(g) (Supp. V. 2012). The language of the statute is substantially the same as when it 
was first codified. Compare Contracts Dispute Act of 1978, 95-563, § 6(b), 92 Stat. 2383, 2384--85 (1978), with 
41 U.S.C. § 7103(g). The Contracts Dispute Act of 1978 was specifically enacted to enhance the government’s 
bargaining position. S. REP. NO. 95--1118, at 1 (1978). 
 239. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 1908 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.249–9(g) (2010)) (emphasis added). 
 240. See id.  
 241. See id. at 1909. 
 242. See id. at 1908. 
 243. See supra Part V.A. 
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sentence: “If upon judicial review any claim is determined to be nonjusticiable, the 
Contracting Officer’s decision on that claim is final and conclusive unless the deci-
sion was arbitrary, capricious, or without a rational basis.” This legislative fix would 
clearly and concisely address the judicial change that the Supreme Court has created 
by reverting the standard to what was de facto in place before the Supreme Court 
ruling.244 The amendment would thus eliminate the additional leverage granted to 
the government.245 Further, the proposed amendment is narrowly tailored to ad-
dress just the small number of cases wherein a government contracting case is 
deemed to be nonjusticiable. 
VI. Conclusion 
In General Dynamics, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a court should 
leave the parties as it found them when the government is unable to adequately re-
spond to a contractor’s prima facie valid superior knowledge claim because the gov-
ernment properly invoked its state secrets privilege.246 Although the Court’s holding, 
on its face, appears to be a practical solution to reduce litigation involving state se-
crets, the Court’s opinion is likely to lead to more litigation over the state secrets 
privilege.247 This expected outcome is directly contrary to the Court’s stated purpose 
in issuing the General Dynamics holding.248 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court could 
have achieved its desired outcome by simply affirming the holding of the Court of 
Federal Claims, which offered a simple solution that adhered to precedent.249 
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